Did kierkegaard write fiction

Not surprisingly, it is in this stage that the Hegelian influence is most pronounced. Stewart provides strong historical evidence to counter this thesis. While the ironic thesis tends to explain this contradiction away by arguing that Kierkegaard was consistently, if at times covertly, anti-Hegelian, Stewart takes seriously the idea that Kierkegaard worked out a more nuanced position in his early period that was neither simply pro- nor anti-Hegel.

Kierkegaard subjectivity

Because of the small size of the intellectual community in Denmark, however, this polemic had to be somewhat veiled and indirect. Instead of simply rejecting Hegel, Kierkegaard consistently borrowed from and reinterpreted Hegelian concepts and methodologies to suit his purposes, even when his purpose ran counter to that of Hegel. Hence, Kierkegaard simply cannot be the rabid anti-Hegelian he is often made out to be.

It is not always clear, however, that the difference cuts deep enough to take Hegel out of the line of fire. Take, for instance, the crucial question of the relation between philosophy and religion. Philosophy according to Hegel seeks to comprehend the content of Christianity conceptually, whereas Christian faith according to Kierkegaard is an infinite pathos that is evoked and sustained by the paradox of incarnation.

Here, it would seem, we face a genuine disagreement between Kierkegaard and Hegel himself, yet Stewart argues that Kierkegaard only challenges Heiberg, who claimed that philosophy includes and accounts for private religious emotions. Hegel is not the target of critique, for on the one hand, Hegel openly acknowledges that private feelings fall below the level of the concept, and on the other hand, Kierkegaard admits that the speculative philosopher or theologian can also be a knight of faith.

Hegel believes that religion is the penultimate form of consciousness which must be surpassed precisely because it is mired in the immediacy of feelings, whereas Kierkegaard holds that faith is higher, for it involves passion and risk in the difficult task of holding fast to that which escapes cognition. Moreover, the idea of a metalevel or metaphilosophical conflict between Hegel and Kierkegaard nicely captures the complexity of the relation.

On the other hand—and here is where I would differ from Stewart—the metalevel thesis provides a good way of understanding the real division that occurred in 19th-century philosophy after Hegel.